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ABSTRACT
This article describes processes involved in developing 
subsystem hazard analyses for Source Controlled Items (SCI), 
specific components, sub-assemblies, and / or piece parts, of 
the NASA ARES I Upper Stage (US) project. SCIs will be 
designed, developed and /or procured by Boeing as an end item 
or an off-the-shelf item. Objectives include explaining the 
methodology, tools, stakeholders and products involved in 
development of these hazard analyses.  Progress made and 
further challenges in identifying potential subsystem hazards 
are also provided in an effort to assist the System Safety 
community in understanding one part of the ARES I Upper 
Stage project.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This System Safety Hazard Analysis includes subsystem hazard 
reports (HRs) documenting the safety risks for the Upper Stage 
Production (USP) Source Control Items (SCI).  Boeing System 
Safety is working with USP Integrated Product Team 
(IPT)/subsystem engineers and NASA Design Team (NDT) 
system safety to pro.vide SCI specific controls and verifications 
applicable to baselined USP Flight System Safety Hazard 
Analyses (HA).
2.0 SCOPE
This document provides the results of the system safety risk 
assessment performed to provide controls and verifications for 
the USP Source Control Items (SCIs):
 Structural and Thermal Pyro Separation Systems
 Main Propulsion System (MPS)
 Reaction Control System (ReCS)
 Roll Control System (RoCS)
 Thrust Vector Control (TVC) System
 Ullage Settling Motors (USM)
The affected hazard analysis will address specific SCI 
requirements and verifications applicable to their associated US
Flight System Safety HA causes and controls.  The location of 
the US within the Ares I vehicle is provided in Figure 2-0.  
General location of the listed subsystems is available in Figure 
2-1.
3.0 SCI HAZARD METHODOLOGY
The identification of safety risks during the Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR), Interim Design Review (IDR) and Critical 
Design Review (CDR) design phases is used to eliminate or 
mitigate hazard risks early in the development phase and to 
clarify safety requirements.  Figure 3.4 outlines the flow for 
performing the SCI Hazard Analysis (HA).  Through data 
gathering and analysis, SCI specific requirements are reviewed 
to identify those SCI requirements which match up with 
baselined Phase I US Flight System Safety Hazard Report (HR) 
controls and verifications.  Applicable requirements and related 
verifications necessary to control baselined US Flight System 
Safety hazards are then recorded in an US HR requirements 
matrices.  The matrices are also used to identify “holes” where 
the analyst believes controls and / or verifications are missing.  
Each SCI HR verification is then updated for its respective US 
Flight System Safety HR control.  Unique SCI hazard reports 
for each SCI subsystem are then developed to a level 
complementary to the level of the design following the 
requirements in CxP 70038, Hazard Analysis Methodology.
The proposed SCI HR verifications will then be documented as 
part of a Safety Assessment Report (SAR), which will be 
provided to Ares I NASA Design Team (NDT) Safety and 
Mission Assurance (S&MA) group, which can be used to assist 
in updating applicable US Flight System Safety HRs prior to 
their assigned Critical Design Review (CDR) timeframe.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100022159 2019-08-30T09:53:00+00:00Z
Figure 2.0.1 – Ares I Elements, Updated to Show Affected Upper Stage Area1
Figure 2.0.2 – General Location of USPC Subsystems2
Interstage
Upper Stage 
Encapsulated Service 
Module (ESM) Panels
Upper Stage 
Core Structure
First Stage
Upper Stage 
Instrumentation Unit
Orion CEV Upper Stage 
Engine
Interstage
Upper Stage
Ullage 
Settling 
Motors
Thrust 
Vector 
Controls
Pyro Separation 
Systems 
(Located in 
Interstage and
Aft Skirt)
Main Propulsion 
System
(Includes areas 
associated with 
LH2 Tank, LO2 
Tank, and Thrust 
Cone)
Reaction Control 
System
(Located on Aft 
Skirt and Thrust 
Cone)
Roll Control 
System 
(Located on First 
Stage and 
Interstage)
3.1 System Safety Risk Reduction / Mitigation 
Precedence
The following system safety risk reduction / mitigation 
precedence sequence in the subsections below is consistent 
with CxP 70038, section 3.1.  Verifications for Hazards 
identified in applicable US Flight System Safety HR utilize the 
following risk reduction order of preference 3:
 Eliminate hazards
 Design to minimize hazards
 Incorporate Safety devices
 Provide Caution and Warning devices
 Develop and implement Special Procedures
Details addressing risk reduction are provided in the following 
subparagraphs.
3.1.1 Standard Risk Reduction Approach
Criteria used to select verifications that help reduce risk for 
applicable to USPC SCI components 4 include:
Eliminate hazards - Hazards will be eliminated from the design 
wherever feasible.
Design for minimum risk - If an identified hazard cannot be 
eliminated, it will be controlled through design selection. This 
can include designing in factors of safety and additional fault 
tolerance.
Incorporate Safety devices - Hazards that cannot be eliminated 
or controlled through design selection shall be controlled to an 
acceptable level through the use of fixed, automatic or other 
protective safety design features or devices.
Provide Warning devices - When neither design nor safety 
devices can effectively eliminate identified hazards, devices 
shall be used to detect the condition and to generate an 
adequate warning signal to alert personnel to the hazard.
Develop and Implement Procedural control - Where it is 
impossible to eliminate or adequately control a hazard through 
design selection or the use of safety and warning devices, 
procedures and training shall be used to control the hazard. 
Procedures may include the use of personal protective 
equipment. Precautionary notations shall be standardized as 
specified by the managing activity. Safety critical tasks and 
activities may require certification of personnel proficiency.
3.1.2 Upper Stage Risk Reduction Approach
Upper Stage S&MA currently employs a combination of 
Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) and Fault Tolerance (FT) 
design philosophies 5 to control hazards identified in this safety 
analysis. Generic Upper Stage DFMR application areas 
include:
− Primary structures/interfaces
− Pressure vessels and pressurized lines and fittings
− Thermal Protection System (TPS)
− Pyrotechnic charges
Areas of Upper Stage design employing fault tolerance (FT) 
controls include:
− Electronic/electrical system
− Reaction control function
− TVC hydraulics
− MPS pressurization and pneumatic system function
− Pyrotechnic activation
Generally, DFMR and FT design requirements for hazard 
control are or will be cited in the individual US Flight System 
Safety hazard reports and will be expanded as each US Flight 
System Safety hazard analysis is updated.
3.2 Hazard Classification
All identified hazards are classified according to their severity 
(effects of the hazard) and likelihood (probability the effect will 
occur).  Both parts of the classification process are qualitative 
in nature and determined by the amount of control in place to 
prevent occurrence.  Once determined, they are combined to 
establish an overall risk classification.
3.2.1 Severity
Per CxP 70038, severity is defined as assessment of the most 
severe effect(s) of a hazard, assigned independently of the 
hazard controls 6.   Definitions for each severity type used in 
US Flight System Safety HRs receiving verifications from 
associated USPC CSI HRs are categorized per CxP 70038, 
Table 5.4-1. 7
NOTE:  Severities are not specifically included in USPC SCI 
HRs since these detailed verifications will assist in updates to 
their associated US Flight System Safety HRs.    Based on new 
verifications and requirements from USPC CSI HRs, US Flight 
System Safety HR authors may be able to show reduced 
severities based on updated “down-and-in” verifications and 
requirements submitted on a case-by-case basis.
3.2.2 Likelihood
Per CxP 70038, para 5.3, likelihood is defined as the 
probability of an identified hazard cause resulting in a mishap.  
Controls in each referenced US Flight System Safety HR are 
considered to be in place when performing the likelihood of 
occurrence assessment .  Each likelihood description, 
referenced in CxP 70038, Table 5.4-1. 8
NOTE:  Likelihoods are also not specifically included in USPC 
SCI HRs since these detailed verifications will assist in updates 
to their associated US Flight System Safety HRs.  Based on 
new verifications and requirements from USPC CSI HRs, US 
Flight System Safety HR authors may be able to show reduced 
likelihoods based on updated “down-and-in” verifications and 
requirements submitted on a case-by-case basis.
3.2.3 Overall Safety Risk
Overall safety risk is defined as the combination of (1) the 
probability (quantitative or qualitative) that a Project or 
Program will experience the undesired event and (2) the 
consequences, impact or severity of the undesired event were it 
to occur 7.  The new Risk Matrix defined in each of the US 
Flight Safety Hazard Reports uses a 5 x 5 matrix defined per 
CxP 70038, which is consistent with many industry standard 5 
x 5 matrices used for risk assessments.  A blank matrix from a 
US Flight System Safety HR using verifications and 
requirements from the USPC SCI SAR is available in CxP 
70038, Figure 5.4-19.
Use of USPC SCI HRs and their associated verifications and 
requirements is expected to lower likelihoods (and maybe some 
severities) of many different Causes in their respective US 
Flight System Safety HRs.  
3.3 USPC SCI Hazard Analysis Approach
Each USPC SCI Hazard Analysis provides verifications to its 
respective current US Flight System Safety Hazard Report.  
The approach used in developing each SCI HR is provided in 
the subsections below.
3.3.1 Data Accumulation
Each assessment is based on obtaining the best available data. 
Data sources include but are not limited to: US SCI element 
system description documents, system diagrams, mission 
descriptions, operational concepts, technical information from 
other engineering organizations (IPT teams), functional flow 
block diagrams, mishap data from similar systems and lessons 
learned from other projects.  A SCI analysis process flow 
diagram overview is provided in Figure 3.3.1.
3.3.2 Analysis Process
After initial data accumulation, three major steps were taken to 
produce each USPC SCI HR section.  This process includes 
selecting only those controls in the US Flight System Safety 
HR that will use “down-and-in” verifications.  A graphical 
representation of this process is available in Figure 3.3.1, which
includes the following overall steps:
1) Defining applicable SCI HR controls as baselined in 
the US Preliminary Design Review timeframe.
2) Development of USPC SCI HR worksheets applicable 
to affected USPC subsystems/components.
3) Development of the USPC SCI Safety Analysis Report 
(SAR), which includes use of the USPC SCI 
worksheets in organized appendices.
Information related to each major step of the analysis process is
available in their respective subsections below.
Figure 3.3.1 – SCI HR Analysis Flow Process
3.2.2.1 Selecting Applicable USPC SCI Controls
Step 1 involved reviewing controls and verifications from each 
baselined Phase 1 US Flight System Safety HR.  An Excel 
spreadsheet listing all applicable US Flight System Safety HR 
Causes and controls to select applicable US Flight System 
Safety hazard report information related to USPC SCI 
verifications.  Columns used for sorting included:
 US Flight System Safety Hazard numbers
 US Flight System Safety title
 Baselined US Flight System Safety Causes
 Baselined US Flight System Safety Controls
 Baselined US Flight System Safety Verifications
Other columns were available in this matrix to assist in 
mapping applicable USPC requirements related to US Flight 
System Safety HR Causes include:
 Boeing (USPC) applicable ??? (Yes/No)
 Related SCI documents ??? (Yes/No)
 (New) Related SCI Verifications
o Detailed Verifications to replace those 
baselined shortly after the US Phase I PDR
 Related SCI Requirements (taken from applicable 
USPC Requirements Documents)
 Comments (used for notes and other suggestions as 
necessary
Upon completion of the SCI HR matrix, each baselined US 
Flight System Safety HR Cause and Control was evaluated for 
applicability to available USPC verifications.  Baselined 
element requirement documents were reviewed for each SCI 
Item to “map” appropriate SCI requirements to applicable US 
Flight System Safety Controls and Verifications.   Selected 
USPC SCI requirement verifications and requirements were 
then updated in the spreadsheet, using a “down-and-in” 
approach, to match the updated verifications with applicable 
US Flight System Safety HR Causes and Controls.  Once 
applicable spreadsheet sections are completed per subsystem, 
development of specific USPC SCI HR worksheets could 
begin.  An example matrix is provided in Appendix A.
3.2.2.2 Development of USPC SCI Hazard Report 
Worksheets
Upon completion of the requirements/verifications matrix 
referenced in section 3.3.2.1, applicable SCI HR worksheets are 
being developed to assist the Upper Stage NDT System Safety 
Team in updating their respective US Flight System Safety 
Causes and Controls.  This process is illustrated in the “middle” 
section of Figure 3.3.1.Bulding the assigned USPC SCI HR 
worksheets included use of the following items from the 
completed verification / requirement matrices:
 Bulleted information from each affected US Flight 
System Safety HR, including:
o Hazard Number
o Hazard Title
o Hazardous Description Condition
o Acceptance rationale
 A table for each US Flight System Safety HR listing 
the following:
o US Flight System Safety Controls selected to 
have “down-and-in” requirements and 
verifications
o Updated verifications used to update those 
baselined during the Upper Stage PDR
o Applicable Safety Requirements related to 
the updated USPC HR verifications
Changes in US Flight System Safety verifications and 
requirements, as identified in applicable USPC SCI HR 
worksheets will be discussed with US Flight System Safety HR 
“owners”.  Final updates will then be made to applicable 
sections of these worksheets to assist the US NDT Flight 
System Safety in providing applicable verifications and 
controls for “down-and-in” Controls.
An example USPC SCI worksheet is provided in Figure 3.2.2.2
3.2.2.3 Documentation of the USPC SCI Safety Analysis 
Report
In an effort parallel to developing the USPC SCI HR 
worksheets, the overall USPC SCI Safety Analysis Report 
(SAR) is also being updated with applicable component 
descriptions.  A flow illustration is provided in the “bottom” 
section of Figure 3.3.1.
Documentation of the USPC SCI SAR includes the following 
overall steps:
 Providing a standard Boeing document template to 
provide a structure for the overall SAR
 Structuring sections of the SAR which include areas 
such as title pages, Table of Contents, Lists of Figures 
and Tables, Introduction, System Descriptions, 
Methodology, Executive Summary, Conclusions, and 
Appendices for USPC SCI HRs listed by IPT.
Figure 3.2.2.3 – Sample USPC SCI HR Matrix
Figure 3.2.2.4 – Sample USPC Hazard Report Worksheet
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 “Filling in” SCI subsystem information using 
available USPC SCI requirement documents
 Updating SCI HR worksheets and descriptions as such 
documents are baselined
 Presentation of an overall draft of the completed 
USPC SCI SAR through Boeing and NASA Design 
Team for final review and signatures
If necessary, presentation of the USPC SCI SAR and/or its 
associated US Flight System Safety Hazard Reports can be 
provided to the Upper Stage Constellation Safety Engineering 
Review Panel (CSERP) prior to incorporation of updates for the 
US Design Configuration Review (DCR).
3.4 SCI HR Review Process/Status
The SCI HR is a Boeing-provided document provided to assist 
in development of current US Flight System Safety Hazard 
Controls and Verifications.  Informal reviews for each SCI 
section will be provided to the MSFC Safety and Mission 
Assurance (S&MA) Working Group prior to delivery.  Internal 
delivery of this document, as a Boeing product per its assigned 
Data Requirements Document, will be carried out in response 
to the assigned Ares I Statement of Work (SOW) Request for 
Proposal.  Agreements for changes necessary to complete 
applicable SCI verifications prior to the US PDR, after initial 
delivery, are documented in Appendix H of the SCI SAR.
4.0 RESULTS
Building any acceptable Safety Assessment Report requires 
teamwork from top to bottom.  Cooperation from the NASA 
Design Team (NDT) and Boeing Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) engineers is a necessity in helping “root out” hazardous
conditions during any and all design stages.  Teamwork to date 
in building the USPC SCI SAR includes the following:
 Internal reviews of each section of the USPC SCI 
spreadsheet with responsible US Flight System Safety 
engineers
 Agreement on the overall USPC SCI HR development 
philosophy by the NASA Design Team and Boeing 
USPC System Safety at the 2010 Upper Stage Offsite 
meeting in Huntsville, AL (January 2010)
 Submittal and review of USPC SCI worksheets as 
delivered per the assigned schedule
 Updates in applicable USPC SCI HR worksheets and 
system descriptions
 Overall support in allowing updates to USPC SCI 
specifications when System Safety concerns are noted
A “matrix” containing 38 baselined Phase I US Flight Safety 
Hazard Reports with associated Causes, Controls, and 
Verifications was created in mid-2009 and completed for 
submittal to MSFC-S&MA (System Safety) in January 2010.  
Development of this matrix allowed in-depth research to select 
which controls/verifications can best use verifications in 
available US IPT requirements documents.  Once the applicable 
requirements were reviewed, over 2000 detailed verifications 
were used to “map” applicable verifications with their 
associated requirements and verifications.  This matrix also is 
useful in developing associated subsystem SCI hazard 
worksheets, which then allows easier updates of applicable US 
Flight System Safety HRs in preparation for their US CDR.
At this time, a total of 35 (TBR) draft subsystem HRs for the 
following subsystems have been provided to their respective 
Boeing and NASA design teams for internal review.  SCI HR 
worksheets prepared for each Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
include:
 Pyrotechnic Separation System (15 HR worksheets)
 Reaction Control System (4 HR Worksheets)
 Roll Control System (8 HR Worksheets)
 Combined ReCS/RoCS (2 HR Worksheets)
 Main Propulsion System (6 HR Worksheets to date)
Creation of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) containing 
detailed system descriptions, methodology, and an Executive 
Summary are in work and are expected to be completed for 
internal review within the next 6 months.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
The proposed updates are expected to assist in defining 
necessary analyses and tests to be detailed for the referenced 
verifications prior to the US CDR.  Future updates will be 
provided to complete verifications for applicable US SCI 
components prior to the US Design Certification Review 
(DCR).
Completion of the assigned SCI Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
and specific HR worksheets will assist the Ares I US System 
Safety team in closing detailed verifications in their baselined 
US Flight System Safety Hazard Analyses.  Each US Flight 
System Safety Engineer can use the enclosed SCI HR 
Worksheets related to their assigned US subsystems to help 
close applicable “down-and-in” verifications, as well as 
allowing Boeing and the NASA Design Team (NDT) Systems 
Engineering group in mapping applicable “down-and-in” 
requirements to higher level requirements for traceability 
purposes.
6.0 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CDR Critical Design Review
CxP Constellation Program
DFMR Design for Minimum Risk
FT Fault Tolerance
HA Hazard Analysis
HR Hazard Report
IDR Interim Design Review
MPS Main Propulsion System
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDT NASA Design Team
PDR Preliminary Design Review
ReCS Reaction Control System
RoCS Roll Control System
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance
SAR Safety Analysis Report
SCI Source Control Item
SOW Statement of Work
TPS Thermal Protection System
TVC Thrust Vector Control System
US Upper Stage
USM Ullage Settling Motors
USMS Ullage Setting Motor System
USP Upper Stage Production
USPC Upper Stage Production Contract
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